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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 920099-CA
Priority No. 2

RICHARD M. GURULE,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1992), whereby the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals in criminal cases except
those involving charges of first degree or capital felonies.
Appellant is charged with a single count of aggravated assault, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1953
as amended).
Pursuant to Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Appellant filed a timely petition for interlocutory review.

On

March 26, 1992, this Court entered its order granting Appellant's
petition for interlocutory review.

A copy of that order is attached

as Addendum A.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The text of relevant constitutional provisions is contained
in Addendum B.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue;

Did the trial court err in altering its prior

suppression order to allow the admission of "eyewitness
identification evidence obtained prior to the illegal search and
seizure"?
Standard of Review,

This Court reviews the trial court's

factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard of review.
However, the question of "whether these facts are sufficient to
demonstrate reliability is a question of law, which [this Court]
review[s] for correctness."

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782

(Utah 1991); see also State v. Mincv, 192 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 21
(Utah App. 1992).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
In an Information dated June 15, 1990, the State charged
Appellant, Richard Gurule, with one count of aggravated assault, a
third degree felony, and one count of trespass, a class B
misdemeanor.

R. 6-7.

The trespass charge was dismissed, and the

charge of aggravated assault was bound over to the district court.
R. 3, o•
On September 27, 1990, Mr. Gurule moved to suppress
"statements of witnesses relating to their identification of
RICHARD M. GURULE at the trial . . . and to suppress their in court
identification of him," claiming that such evidence violated federal
and state due process.

R. 20. A copy of this motion to suppress is

contained in Addendum C.
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On March 19, 1991, Mr. Gurule moved to suppress "all
evidence acquired subsequent to, or as the result of the illegal
entry into defendant's home in violation of the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article I Section 14 of the Utah
State Constitution."

R. 25. A copy of this second motion to

suppress is also contained in Addendum C.
On April 11, 1991, the trial judge held an evidentiary
hearing on both motions.

The transcript of that hearing is

contained in the record on appeal and referred to as R. 147-367.
On April 17, 1991, the trial judge made a minute entry
indicating that Mr. Gurule's motions were granted.

R. 31. See

Addendum D for copy of April 17, 1991 minute entry.
On May 8, 1991, the trial judge signed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law which had been submitted that day by defense
counsel. R. 32-36. A copy of such Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law is contained in Addendum E.
On May 15, 1991, the State filed objections to the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

R. 37.

In a hearing held June 21, 1991, the trial judge stated
that his prior ruling did not "preclude the state from offering
evidence of events prior to the search."

R. 369.1

He then gave the

parties an opportunity to brief the issue of whether pre-seizure
identification testimony was admissible.

R. 41, 372.

Appellant's

1. The transcript of the hearings held on June 21, 1991 and
October 19, 1991 is contained in a single volume and marked
R. 368-378.
- 3 -

memorandum on this issue is found at R. 50-59; the State's
memorandum is found at R. 42-9.
Thereafter, the trial judge ruled that eyewitness
identification evidence which occurred prior to the illegal search
and seizure was admissible, if otherwise competent, and that such
evidence was not to be suppressed as part of his prior suppression
order.

R. 126; Addendum F.

On January 28, 1992, the trial judge

entered Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
R. 128-131. A copy of the Supplemental Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law is contained in Addendum G.
Pursuant to Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
Mr. Gurule timely petitioned this Court for interlocutory review of
the January 28, 1992 order allowing the admission of pre-seizure
identification evidence.

On March 26, 1992, this Court entered its

order granting such interlocutory review.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The trial judge made the following factual findings which,
except for the date of the incident, are supported by the record and
not clearly erroneous2:
1.

On May 1, 1990 officers from the West Valley Police

Department responded to an alleged aggravated assault situation at

2. The record cite following each finding indicates the transcript
page or pages on which this Court can find support for the finding.
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are contained in
Addendum E and can be found in the district court file at R. 32-6.
This Statement of Facts quotes those findings verbatim.
- 4
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3215 South Oriole Way.3
2.

R. 261, 295, 326.

That upon arriving the officers heard witnesses

proclaim that someone that might be responsible for the aggravated
assault had run in to the residence at 2561 Starling Avenue.
R. 262, 304.
3.

That 2561 Starling Avenue is the defendant's home.

4.

That although the officers believed that witnesses had

R. 340.

stated that the perpetrators had entered the residence on Starling
Avenue, no witnesses had observed the perpetrator enter that
residence.
5.

R. 184, 306, 359-60.4
That there was no further investigation by the West

Valley Police Officers prior to their entering the defendant's home
and had there been further investigation it would have revealed that
there was, in fact, no basis to believe that the perpetrator of the
aggravated assault had entered the home.

R. 262-3, 296, 304-6.

3. The incident actually occurred in the early morning hours of
May 5, 1990. R. 261. Officer Mattfeld responded first and was the
officer in charge of the investigation. R. 261. Officers Mattfeld,
Ivino and Call all testified that they responded to a "fight" rather
than an aggravated assault. R. 261, 295, 326.
4. Eddy Knowlden testified that there was a big fence around the
Gurule home and only the roof of the Gurule home was visible from
the Knowlden house. R. 184, 197. Rodney Knowlden testified that
when Dale Haddenham was hit, Dale, Eddy, Rodney and possibly Jody
were outside. R. 359. Rodney had the best view of the Gurule home,
and he did not see the retreating assailant enter that house.
R. 360. To the best of Rodney's knowledge, no one who witnessed the
assault on Dale saw the assailant enter the Gurule house. R. 360.
(continued)
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6.

That the officers pounded on the doors of the Gurule

home on Starling Avenue until such time as Lynette Gurule came to
the back door.
7.

R. 263-4, 330.

That Ms. Gurule refused entry to the home indicating to

the officers that a search warrant was required prior to entry.
R. 265, 294, 309, 310, 331, 346.5
8.

That the officers entered the Gurule home in the face

of the refusal by Lynette Gurule and in the absence of any consent
by her.

R. 265, 267, 287, 294.
9.

That upon entering the home defendant, Richard M.

Gurule, was seized and he was subsequently forced to appear in a
"show-up" procedure at which time witnesses to the alleged
aggravated assault viewed his person.
10.

R. 300, 334-5.

That the defendant was the only person in the

(footnote 4 continued)
Officer Ivino acknowledged that it was possible that none
of the witnesses had seen the assailant enter the Gurule home.
R. 305. The State did not present any witnesses who claimed to have
seen the perpetrator enter the Gurule home. Dan Dimick testified
that he saw four or five men go around the rear of a corner house.
R. 252. It is not clear whether he was referring to the Gurule
home, but even if he were, he did not testify that he saw the men go
inside and could not connect them to the incident at the Knowlden
house. R. 252, 256. Mr. Dimick did not know if the four were
Hispanic. R. 256. Officer Mattfeld claimed that some unknown
person had told him that he or she saw the perpetrators enter the
house but could not recall who that person was. R. 284.
5. Officer Mattfeld testified that he could not recall Ms. Gurule
asking for a search warrant. R. 284. Lynette and Danielle Gurule
testified that Lynette did ask for a search warrant. R. 331, 346.
The trial judge's finding that Ms. Gurule requested a search warrant
is further indication that the trial judge did not find all aspects
of Officer Mattfeld7s testimony credible.
- 6
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"show-up" which matched the physical description of the aggravated
assault perpetrator.
11.

R. 245.

That there was conflicting testimony in regards as to

whether the eyewitnesses viewed the participants in the "show-up"
individually or collectively; that is, while discussing the matter
with each other.

But that in any event at least some of the persons

claiming to have made an eyewitness identification of the defendant
had the opportunity to observe other eyewitnesses choose defendant
as the perpetrator of the offense prior to making their own
determination.

R. 215-17, 269, 276, 277, 302, 313, 339, 340, 352,

353-4.
12.

That the eyewitnesses had been drinking prior to

making identification and in at least one instance were drinking
beer at the time the identification was made.
13.

R. 273, 353.

That the police failed to obtain or maintain any

permanent record regarding descriptions of the assailant given by
the eyewitnesses prior to the time the "show-up" occurred.

R. 262,

263, 274, 316.6
14.

That the police failed to record which of the

eyewitnesses identified the defendant as the perpetrator of the

6. Officers Mattfeld and Ivino testified that they did not record
any descriptions given prior to the showup. R. 280, 305-7. Nor did
Officer Mattfeld recall the descriptions. R. 280. Mattfeld
testified that he handed out witness statement forms before the
showup and that the statements "were started at that point in time"
(R. 275), but he did not testify as to when the statements were
completed or otherwise demonstrate that any descriptions in the
statements were recorded before the showup tainted the witnesses'
perception. Officer Call went straight to the Gurule home when he
arrived. R. 326.
- 7
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assault*

R. 278.
15.

That the police failed to record which of the

eyewitnesses identified Richard Gurule as the person who while in
the house prior to the assault on Mr. Haddenham assaulted Dorothy
Knowlden and therefore could not have been the assailant of the
victim, Mr. Haddenham.
16.

R. 279, 280, 359.

That the two eyewitnesses that testified in regards to

their opportunity to observe the actual assault, testified one had
five seconds and the other observed the assailant for two seconds.
Both witnesses acknowledged that it was a stressful situation and
their attention was diverted by factors such as, other persons
coming at them.

R. 182, 205, 206.

The following facts are also relevant to the issue of
whether the pre-seizure identification was so tainted by the
subsequent suggestive procedure and fourth amendment violation so as
to make any pre-seizure identification evidence unreliable and
inadmissible.
When Officer Mattfeld first arrived at the Knowlden home on
Oriole Way, people were out in the street pointing to the house on
Starling Avenue.

R. 262, 295.

The scene was chaotic, and the

officer briefly talked with people in the street.
295.

R. 262, 263, 273,

He did not record the names of the people he spoke with or the

information they gave him, and could not recall the names or
information during the suppression hearing.

R. 262, 274.

The State

was unable to demonstrate who the officer talked to, whether those
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people had observed the incident at the Knowlden house or anything
else that was relevant to this case, or what the officer was in fact
told before he decided to enter the house.
Officer Ivino testified that he proceeded to the Starling
Avenue home because there were people in the street pointing at that
house and yelling that "they went in there."
did not know who these people were.

R. 304.

R. 296, 304.

Officer Ivino

He also

acknowledged that it was possible that none of the witnesses
actually saw the assailant run into the Gurule home.

R. 305. He

was not sure that the people who were in the street and pointing at
the Gurule house had been in the Knowlden home when the incident
occurred.

R. 306.

Although various witnesses were pointing at the Gurule
home, no one said that the person who hit Mr. Haddenham was their
neighbor, Richard Gurule.

R. 198, 271, 281.

The officers did not record which persons appeared in the
showup, and Officer Mattfeld was not certain how many men were
presented to the witnesses in that procedure.

R. 275. The

witnesses gave varying estimates as to the number of people who
appeared in the showup.
The persons seized inside the Gurule home stood in a line
behind a chainlink fence.

R. 301. Headlights from vehicles were

used to illuminate the persons in the showup.

R. 301.

Officer Ivino heard two of the witnesses yell, "that's him, that's
him."

At least one of the witnesses said, "that's him, but he had a

different shirt on."

R. 302. The person yelling also gestured and
- 9
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pointed at Appellant.

R. 313.

could see the gesture.

The people standing around outside

R. 313.

Officer Accocks also heard one of the witnesses say,
"That's him there," and saw the witness point to Appellant.

R. 322.

Officer Ivino testified that two people selected
Mr. Gurule.
people.

R. 314.

R. 314.

The officer could remember only one of these

Officer Ivino had no records and could not recall

if he had filed a report.

R. 316.

Officer Mattfeld recalled that only one of the witnesses,
Mr. Knowlden,7 selected Mr. Gurule as the perpetrator of the
aggravated assault.

R. 270, 271, 277.

Eddy Knowlden wears

corrective lenses but did not have them on that night.

R. 283.

Officer Mattfeld was unaware that Eddy needed corrective lenses to
see properly.

R. 283.

The officer did not recall how many people

he brought over for an attempt to identify, and he did not record
that information.

He estimated he asked four to six people to make

an identification, but he did not put that in his report and could
not recall if any more than one person had selected Mr. Gurule.
R. 278.

The others identified Mr. Gurule as being in the residence

but did not see who hit Mr. Haddenham.

R. 271.

Two of the witnesses identified Mr. Gurule as being the
person who tore Mrs. Knowlden's fingernail and slammed the door in
her face.

R. 279.

This was the person Mr. Haddenham was chasing

and could not have been the person who stepped from behind a car and

7. It is unclear whether Officer Mattfeld was referring to Eddy or
Rodney Knowlden.
- 10 -

hit him.

R. 280.

In other words, while at least three witnesses

apparently selected Mr. Gurule, they attributed conflicting roles to
him, one of which would have absolved him of the charges in the
instant case.
Several of the witnesses selected Eloy Esguivel as being a
person who was in the Knowlden house.

R. 283. However, the police

investigation established that Mr. Esquivel was at the La Frontera
Restaurant at the time of the incident in the Knowlden home.

R. 283.

Dorothy Knowlden did not see the person who hit Dale.
R. 158. She was confused and uncertain about who was in her house.
R. 166.

She thought everyone looked alike.

give a pre-seizure description to officers.

R. 167. She did not
R. 165.

Eddy Knowlden saw the person who hit Dale but apparently
did not have his corrective lenses in and was preoccupied by the
crowd with bats and beer cans and the person with a bat who came
after him from behind a tree. R. 177, 185. There is no evidence of
a pre-seizure description by him.
Rodney Knowlden was about eleven feet away from Dale's
assailant.
activity.

R. 229. He, too, was aware of the crowd and other
R. 227-9.

Although he claimed to have made a pre-seizure

description, the trial judge found otherwise based on the testimony
of the officers.

R. 35, 280.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The State presented testimony regarding the identifications
by three witnesses.

By failing to present testimony regarding any
- 11 -

descriptions by other witnesses, the State has failed to sustain its
burden of establishing the reliability and admissibility of
pre-seizure descriptions by any other witnesses.
The State also failed to sustain its burden of establishing
the reliability and admissibility of any pre-seizure descriptions by
the three witnesses.

The trial judge found both a due process and

fourth amendment violation.

An analysis of the factors applicable

to each violation establishes that each violation mandates
suppression of "pre-seizure" identification testimony.
Applying the five Ramirez/Long factors to any "pre-seizure"
description by Dorothy, Rodney and Eddy Knowlden requires
suppression.

Most compelling is the fact that the officers did not

keep a record of any pre-seizure descriptions.
The fourth amendment violation also requires suppression of
any "pre-seizure" descriptions.

The State cannot establish that the

witnesses' "knowledge of and ability to reconstruct the prior
criminal occurrence and to identify the defendant" is from an
independent recollection of observations at the time of the crime.
Nor can the State establish that the charge against Mr. Gurule is
not the fruit of the fourth amendment violation.

ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL COURTS RULING REGARDING THE
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE NECESSARILY REQUIRES
THAT THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY
OBTAINED PRIOR TO THE ENTRY OF THE GURULE HOME
AND SUBSEQUENT SHOWUP BE SUPPRESSED.

- 12 -

In the present case, Mr. Gurule filed two separate motions
to suppress, each of which was directed at suppressing the same
evidence.

The first motion moved "to suppress statements of

witnesses relating to their identification of RICHARD M. GURULE at
the trial . . . and to suppress their in court identification of
him11 based on the suggestive identification procedure utilized in
this case.

R. 20; see Addendum C.

The second motion requested that the trial judge "suppress
all evidence acquired subsequent to, and as a result of the illegal
entry into defendant's home in violation of the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution."

R. 25; see Addendum C.

The trial judge concluded that both a due process and
search and seizure violation occurred in this case, and granted both
motions.

R. 31. Although the trial judge later clarified that his

ruling was not intended to suppress any pre-seizure identification
testimony, his ruling that both a fourth amendment and an Article I,
Section 7 violation occurred in this case remain in place.
The State has the burden of establishing the reliability of
any pre-seizure identification.

Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 778.

In the

present case, three potential witnesses, Rodney, Eddy and Dorothy
Knowlden, testified at the hearing.

To the extent that any other

witness with a "pre-seizure" description of the assailant might
exist, the State has failed to sustain its burden of establishing
the reliability of that witness' "pre-seizure" identification
testimony.

Furthermore, a review of the testimony at the hearing
- 13 -

establishes that the trial judge erroneously concluded that
"pre-seizure" identification testimony by these three witnesses is
admissible.

A. THE STATE DUE PROCESS VIOLATION WHICH
OCCURRED AS THE RESULT OF THE SUGGESTIVE SHOWUP
REQUIRES THAT ANY TESTIMONY REGARDING PRE-SEIZURE
DESCRIPTIONS OR IDENTIFICATIONS BE SUPPRESSED.
In State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 779-80 (Utah 1991), the
Utah Supreme Court adopted an analytical model for assessing the
admissibility of eyewitness identifications under the Utah
constitution which is more rigorous than the federal model and which
takes into account various scientific studies which deal with the
reliability of eyewitness identification.

The court required "an

in-depth appraisal of the identification's reliability along the
lines laid out in rState v.l Long [721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah 1986)]"
for assessing whether an identification procedure violates state due
process so as to preclude admissibility of such evidence.

Under the

Utah constitution, "ft]he ultimate question to be determined is
whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification
was reliable."

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781.

The pertinent factors for determining reliability of an
identification under the Utah constitution are:
(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the
actor during the event; (2) the witness's degree
of attention to the actor at the time of the
event, (3) the witness's capacity to observe the
event, including his or her physical and mental
acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification
was made spontaneously and remained consistent
thereafter, or whether it was the product of
suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being
- 14 -

observed and the likelihood that the witness
would perceive, remember and relate it
correctly. This last area includes such factors
as whether the event was an ordinary one in the
mind of the observer during the time it was
observed, and whether the race of the actor was
the same as the observer's.
Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 781, quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493.
The trial judge applied these Ramirez/Long factors, and
determined that the showup identification was unduly suggestive, in
violation of Article I, Section 7 of the Utah constitution.

These

factors are equally applicable in determining whether any
pre-seizure identification evidence is admissible.
Case law interpreting the federal constitution provides
further guidance in determining whether the pre-seizure
identifications are so tainted by the subsequent events that
testimony regarding the pre-seizure identifications is inadmissible.
In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18
L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), the United States Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether a witness could make an in-court identification of
a defendant after having viewed the defendant at a lineup where the
defendant was denied his right to counsel.8

The court recognized

that without proper limits, an "accused/s conviction may rest on a
courtroom identification in fact the fruit of a suspect pretrial
identification which the accused is helpless to subject to effective
scrutiny at trial."

Wade, 388 U.S. at 235.

8. Although the primary illegality in Wade was the denial of the
right to counsel at the lineup, the court focused on the potential
for misidentification and its effect on a fair trial in determining
that a right to counsel exists at a lineup.
- 15 -

A rule limited solely to the exclusion of
testimony concerning identification at the lineup
itself, without regard to admissibility of the
courtroom identification, would render the right
to counsel an empty one. The lineup is most
often used, as in the present case, to
crystallize the witnesses7 identification of the
defendant for future reference. We have already
noted that the lineup identification will have
that effect. The State may then rest upon the
witnesses7 unequivocal courtroom identification,
and not mention the pretrial identification as
part of the State7s case at trial. Counsel is
then in the predicament in which Wade7s counsel
found himself—realizing that possible unfairness
at the lineup may be the sole means of attack
upon the equivocal courtroom identification, and
having to probe in the dark in an attempt to
discover and reveal the unfairness, while
bolstering the government witness7 courtroom
identification by bringing out and dwelling upon
his prior identification.
Allowing pre-showup identification testimony places a
defendant in the same bind that allowing in-court identification
creates.

Eyewitnesses could testify to a pre-seizure description of

the perpetrator, and the defendant would not be able to undermine
that testimony by showing that the witnesses7 description was
tainted by subsequent events.
Recognizing these concerns, the Wade court, relying on
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407,
9 L.Ed.2d 441, 455 (1967), articulated the following test for
determining whether an in-court identification will be allowed after
a lineup held in violation of a defendant7s right to counsel.
"Whether, granting establishment of the primary
illegality, the evidence to which the instant
objection is made has been come at by exploiting
of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the
primary taint." [citations omitted] Application
of this test in the present context requires
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consideration of various factors; for example,
the prior opportunity to observe the alleged
criminal act, the existence of any discrepancy
between any pre-lineup description, any
identification prior to lineup of another person,
the identification by picture of the defendant
prior to the lineup, failure to identify the
defendant on a prior occasion, and the lapse of
time between the alleged act and the lineup
identification.
Wade. 388 U.S. at 241.
In State v. Williams. 381 S.E.2d 265 (W.V. 1989), the court
also explored the issue of whether a witness could make an in-court
identification after a lineup was held in violation of the
defendant's right to counsel.

The court determined that any

in-court identification was tainted by the prior proceedings, and
that the cumulative effect of exposure to the defendant was
"instrumental" in the witness' "growing certainty of appellant's
identity as one of the robbers."

See also Edwards v. State. 538

So.2d 440, 442 (Fla. 1989).
In order to admit identification testimony at trial, such
testimony must "be reliable and based solely upon the witness'
independent recollection of the offender at the time of the crime,
uninfluenced by the intervening illegal confrontation.
omitted]."

Id. at 442.

[citations

In the present case, the trial judge's

ruling appears to preclude an in-court identification but allow
pre-seizure description.

The analysis in Ramirez and Wade for

assessing the reliability of an identification is similarly
applicable to any pre-seizure descriptions.

The potential for

tainting a pre-seizure memory with information from subsequent
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events mandates that the pre-seizure testimony be an independent,
reliable recollection, untainted by the subsequent suggestive
procedures, in order to be admissible.
In the present case, the trial judge concluded that the
Ramirez/Long factors demonstrated the unreliability of the showup
procedure.

Application of those factors to the identifications made

by Rodney, Dorothy and Eddy Knowlden establishes that the trial
judge erroneously concluded that pre-seizure identification
testimony was admissible.

1.

DOROTHY KNOWLDEN

The lack of reliability and need for suppression of any
"pre-seizure" description by Mrs. Knowlden is demonstrated by the
application of the five Ramirez/Long factors.

a.

Opportunity to View

Mrs. Knowlden did not have the opportunity to view the
perpetrator of the assault and had only a very limited opportunity
to view the people in her house.

R. 158, 164-6.

The people who

were in her house were there for only a couple of minutes, and she
was excited and distracted by all the activity.

b.

R. 164-6.

Degree of Attention to the Actor

Mrs. Knowlden was distracted by the quick sequence of
events, the number of people in her house, and her broken
fingernail.

R. 164-7.

The person she paid the most attention to
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was the person who broke her fingernail.

R. 157-8, 166.

Nevertheless, she had tremendous difficulty describing him.
R. 164-6. Mrs. Knowlden's degree of attention to each individual in
her house was very limited.

Furthermore, the State failed to

establish what degree of attention, if any, she paid to the person
who might have been Mr. Gurule, if, in fact, he were even in her
home.

c.

The Witness' Capacity to Observe

Mrs. Knowlden is older and acknowledged that her age was
affecting her perceptions.

R. 166.

She also pointed out that she

got excited, which apparently affected her ability to perceive.
R. 167.

She acknowledged that the people in her house and in the

showup all looked alike to her, even though Mr. Gurule was the only
short, heavy-set man in the showup.

R. 167_

She stated, "[w]ell, I

thought they all looked a lot alike, but like I say, I get
excited."

R. 167.

She testified that she was confused and was not

sure who was in her kitchen.

R. 166.

She stated, "[t]there were

too many young men in dark clothes and it happened so fast and I am
getting old."

R. 166.

Mrs. Knowlden's capacity to observe was extremely limited.

d. Whether Identification is Product of
Suggestion
Officers did not record any pre-seizure descriptions.
Mrs. Knowlden testified that she did not talk to officers until
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after the showup.

R. 165. Under such circumstances, it is

impossible for the State to sustain its burden of establishing that
any description Mrs. Knowlden might adopt as the description prior
to the seizure was not tainted by the subsequent events.
Repeated exposure to a defendant can result in increased
certainty that such person was the perpetrator.

In this case,

Mrs. Knowlden is now fully aware that Mr. Gurule is her neighbor.
She has seen him at the showup, in court at the preliminary and
motion hearings, and in her neighborhood.

R. 170-1.

At the motion hearing, Mrs. Knowlden appeared uncertain
whether Mr. Gurule had been in her house.

Under such circumstances,

any pre-seizure description by Mrs. Knowlden is unreliable and
should be suppressed.

e.

Nature of the Event

Although the event was not ordinary, the excitement of the
incident worked against Mrs. Knowlden being able to recall details.
She was flustered and testified repeatedly that she was having
difficulty because she got excited.

R. 166, 167.

In addition, the

men in her house were all members of a different race.

The impact

of this racial difference in limiting Mrs. Knowlden's ability to
identify the men in her house is emphasized by Mrs. Knowlden's
testimony that they all looked alike to her even though the build
and physical descriptions of the men differed markedly.
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All five Ramirez/Long factors work against admission of
Mrs. Knowlden's pre-seizure description.

Application of these

factors establishes that the trial judge incorrectly concluded that
the State had sustained its burden of establishing the reliability
of this testimony.
Application of the Wade test also establishes that the
State failed to sustain its burden of establishing the admissibility
of a pre-seizure description by Mrs. Knowlden.

As outlined above,

Mrs. Knowlden had no opportunity to view the person who hit Dale and
only a limited opportunity to view the various people in her house.
There is no record of a pre-seizure description, which makes
admission of such a description even less reliable than when there
is a discrepancy.

Without a record of a description given by

Mrs. Knowlden prior to the seizure, the State could not sustain its
burden of establishing the admissibility of any such testimony.

2.

EDDY KNOWLDEN

The lack of reliability of any pre-seizure description by
Eddy is demonstrated by application of the Ramirez/Long factors and
the Wade test.

a.

Opportunity to View

The distance at which Eddy viewed the assailant is not
clear.

He testified at the motion hearing that he was six to eight

feet away but apparently testified at the preliminary hearing that
he was eighteen feet away.

Rodney testified that Eddy was twelve to
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thirteen feet away.

R. 239.

Rodney, who was eleven feet from the

assailant, got blood on his shirt when Dale was hit.

R. 238.

Rodney testified that no one other than the assailant was close
enough to get blood on his shirt.

Hence, it appears that Eddy was

farther away than eight feet when Dale was hit.

It was nighttime

and the driveway was illuminated by a carport light and light from
the kitchen window.

Given the discrepancy in testimonies, it is

unclear whether Eddy had an adequate opportunity to view the
assailant.

b.

Degree of Attention to Person Who Hit Dale

After Eddy emerged from the Knowlden house, he chased one
individual while Dale chased another.

R. 177.

Eddy saw a number of

people at the end of the driveway and in the street; some were
throwing beer cans and making a lot of noise.

R. 153.

He also saw

a person crouched behind a pine tree with something in his hands.
R. 177.

Eddy stopped running and started backing up towards the

Knowlden house when that person jumped at him with a bat in his
hands.

R. 177.
It was at this time that Eddy also saw "Dale going to the

ground" and a "kid" standing nearby, holding something.
He also saw something fly through the air.

R. 177-80.

R. 180.

Eddy acknowledged that the event was traumatic, he did not
know what happened, he was trying to figure out what occurred, and
he was looking at everyone to see if someone else was going to get
hit.

R. 180, 195.
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Eddy testified that everything seemed to stop for about ten
seconds, "like someone hit pause on a VCR," when Dale was hit.
R. 182.9
During this time, Eddy looked back and forth from Dale to
the person who hit Dale but was also preoccupied with the person
coming at him from behind the pine tree and the crowd in the
street.

R. 183.
Given the number of people Eddy was tuning into during a

short period of time and Eddy's fear for his own safety, the degree
of attention focused on Dale's assailant was limited.

c.

Capacity to Observe Event

Eddy Knowlden is nearsighted and had removed his lenses
earlier in the evening.

R. 186.

He had to get very close during

the showup.
Eddy testified that he was "freaked out" by the events and
was trying to figure out what was happening.

R. 195.

Eddy's poor eyesight and confusion weigh against admission
of any pre-seizure description by him.

d.

Whether Product of Suggestion

Because there is no record of a pre-seizure description
made by Eddy, the State cannot sustain its burden of establishing

9. At the preliminary hearing, Eddy apparently testified that this
"pause" lasted maybe five or as much as ten seconds. R. 205.
Rodney testified that the pause lasted seven or eight seconds.
R. 230.
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that any pre-seizure identification is not the product of
suggestion.

The trial judge determined that the showup was

suggestive? any pre-seizure description now adopted by Eddy would
necessarily be tainted by his repeated viewing of Richard Gurule.
Eddy testified that he did not recognize the stocky kid who
hit Dale.

R. 183.

He had seen Richard Gurule before but did not

name him as the perpetrator when he spoke to police.

R. 197, 198.

It was only during the showup when Eddy selected Mr. Gurule that he
recognized his neighbor. R. 204. He was not sure, however, whether
Mr. Gurule was one of the people who entered the house.

R. 188.

Eddy cannot remember details from the incident or what he
told the officers on the night of the incident.
about everything now is somewhat unclear."

He said his "memory

R. 222.

He had trouble

remembering testifying at the preliminary hearing because almost a
year had passed.

R. 197. He could not remember how many people

were in the showup but thought there were five or six.

R. 201.

Officers apparently showed him the individuals at least twice.
R. 211.
Under such circumstances, the State cannot establish that
any "pre-seizure" description Eddy might give is not tainted by the
interviewing procedure and selection of Mr. Gurule.

e.

Nature of the Event

Although the event was a traumatic one, the nature of the
event seemed to work against Eddy's ability to perceive and recall a
description of the assailant.
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In addition, Appellant is Hispanic and Eddy is White.

This

weighs against the reliability of any description.
Any pre-seizure description of the assailant is unreliable
under the Ramirez/Long factors.

3.

RODNEY KNOWLDEN

a.

Opportunity to View

Dale followed Eddy out of the house as Eddy ran behind
Dale.

R. 227. Rodney testified that he was about eight feet behind

Dale when a person stepped from behind a truck and swing.

Rodney

"heard a loud thud and Dale landed on his back on the lawn."
R. 229.

Rodney was about eleven feet away from the assailant.

R. 229.

A carport light and light shining from the kitchen window

illuminated the scene.

R. 229.

Rodney testified that the assailant looked right at him.
Rodney also mentioned the pause that Eddy described as occurring
immediately after Dale was hit, claiming that it lasted seven, eight
seconds while he and the assailant stared at each other.

R. 230.

The lighting conditions and distance suggest that Rodney
did not have a good opportunity to view the assailant.

b.

Degree of Attention

When Rodney first got outside the Knowlden house, he saw
people everywhere—on the lawn, in the street.

R. 227. Although he

testified that he looked directly at the assailant for seven or
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eight seconds, his attention during that time was necessarily
diverted by Dale, Eddy and the people in the street and driveway.
R. 230.

c.

Capacity to Observe

Not much evidence exists on this point.

Rodney had

apparently been drinking and made his showup selection about
thirty-five feet away, based primarily on a beard.

d.

R. 231.

Whether Product of Suggestion

The trial judge found that "the police failed to obtain or
maintain any permanent record regarding descriptions of the
assailant prior to the time the 'showup' occurred."

R. 34. 1 0

This

10. Officer Mattfeld did not record the physical description that
each of the witnesses gave him. R. 280. He testified that there
was no report that recorded the physical description given by the
witnesses before the showup and that he did not have an independent
recollection of the description. R. 280.
Officer Mattfeld further testified that he "really had a
poor identification as to who they were as far as just physical
descriptions." R. 290. He testified that he only got statements as
to what had happened before he went to the Gurule house. R. 274-5.
After he entered the Gurule house, he returned to the witnesses and
apparently gave them forms to fill out. He testified that the
written statements "were started at that point in time" and the
officer returned to the Gurule house and set up the showup. R. 275.
Rodney testified that he filled out a written statement for
police before being taken to the showup. R. 233. He indicated that
he was asked to provide as much detail as possible. R. 234. He
described the person as 5 feet 6 inches tall and weighing 200
pounds, with a small beard at the end of his chin. R. 234. No
other description was provided. R. 234.
In light of such testimony, the trial judge's ruling is not
clearly erroneous.
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finding is supported by Officer Mattfeld's testimony that he did not
record the physical description given by the witnesses before the
showup, and he did not have an independent recollection of the
description.

R. 280.

Officer Mattfeld also testified that he

"really had a poor identification as to who they were as far as
physical descriptions."

R. 290.

In addition, Officer Mattfeld testified that he only
obtained statements as to what occurred before he entered the Gurule
home.

R. 274-5. After entering the home, Officer Mattfeld returned

to the witnesses and apparently gave them forms to fill out.
Officer Mattfeld testified that the written statements "were started
at that point in time" and the officer returned to the Gurule
house.

R. 275.
Although Rodney testified that he filled out the form

before being taken to the showup (R. 233), the trial judge found
otherwise.

The trial judge7s finding was not against the clear

weight of the evidence in light of Officer Mattfeld7s testimony and
that of the other officers who indicated that they did not obtain
descriptions before the showup.
In the absence of a pre-seizure description, the State
could not sustain its burden of establishing that any description
the witnesses claimed to be a pre-seizure description was not the
product of subsequent events.
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e.

Nature of the Event

Although the event was not an ordinary one, its traumatic
nature, coupled with the fact that many people were standing around
who appeared threatening and who may have impacted on Rodney's
perception, demonstrates that tuning into a specific face and
recalling sufficient details would be extremely unlikely.

The

difficulty of making a reliable identification under such
circumstances is underscored by the vague and general description
Rodney gave.

Despite the fact that officers told him to include as

much detail as possible, Rodney identified his assailant as 5 feet
6 inches tall, 200 pounds, with a small beard at the end of his chin.

When the five Ramirez/Long factors are considered, it is
apparent that the trial judge was incorrect in concluding that the
State had sustained its burden of establishing the reliability of
any pre-seizure identification testimony by Rodney.

B. THE ILLEGAL SEIZURE REQUIRES SUPPRESSION OF
ALL PRE-SEIZURE IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE.
The trial court's ruling that the entry into the Gurule
home and seizure of Appellant violated the fourth amendment (R. 31,
35-6) requires that all evidence that is a "fruit" or "product" of
that seizure be suppressed.

Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.

471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).

"The exclusionary

prohibition extends as well to the indirect as the direct products"
of such fourth amendment violations.

United States v. Crews, 445
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U.S. 463, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980), quoting Wong Sun,
371 U.S. at 484.
In United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, the United States
Supreme Court considered the issue of whether "an in-court
identification of the accused by the victim should be suppressed as
the fruit of the defendant's unlawful arrest."

445 U.S. at 465. In

Crews. the defendant was illegally arrested and transported to the
police station, where officers photographed him.

Thereafter,

officers showed the victim a photo array which included the
photograph taken of the defendant while he was being illegally held.
The trial court in Crews ruled that the photo array and
subsequent lineup were the products of the illegal arrest but that
the victim had an independent, untainted recollection of the
assailant and therefore could make an in-court identification.
In analyzing whether a victim could make an in-court
identification following a fourth amendment violation, the United
States Supreme Court focused on three distinct elements.
First, the victim is present at trial to testify
as to what transpired between her and the
offender, and to identify the defendant as the
culprit. Second, the victim possesses knowledge
of and the ability to reconstruct the prior
criminal occurrence and to identify the defendant
from her observations of him at the time of the
crime. And third, the defendant is also
physically present in the courtroom, so that the
victim can observe him and compare his appearance
to that of the offender.
445 U.S. at 471.

In determining whether the in-court identification

is admissible, the court must focus on whether any of "these three
elements 'has been come at by exploitation' of the violation of the
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defendant's Fourth Amendment rights."

Crews, 445 U.S. 471, quoting

Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488.
In the present case, the trial court apparently is
disallowing an in-court identification but permitting identification
testimony as to descriptions and other identification information
known to witnesses prior to the illegal seizure.
130.

R. 31, 32-6, 126,

The Crews test for determining the taint caused by the illegal

seizure is equally applicable in determining the taint to
pre-seizure identification evidence as it is to determining whether
an in-court identification is admissible.
Although this case has not yet gone to trial, it appears
that the State can establish that the presence of Dorothy, Eddy and
Rodney Knowlden at trial is not the exploitation of the fourth
amendment violation.
The second element focuses on the witness' "knowledge of
and ability to reconstruct the prior criminal occurrence and to
identify the defendant from [his/] her observations of him at the
time of the crime."

445 U.S. at 471, 473.

In analyzing this

element, the court focused on the independent recollections of the
victim in determining that her ability to select the defendant was
not tainted by the intervening photo array and lineup.

The court

adopted the trial court's determination that the witness' courtroom
identification "rested upon an independent recollection from her
initial encounter with the assailant."

445 U.S. at 473.

The court

noted that it "attach[ed] particular significance to the following
circumstances which support[ed] the trial court's determination."
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[T]he victim viewed her assailant at close range
for a period of 5-10 minutes under excellent
lighting conditions and with no distractions.
R 4, 7, 111; respondent closely matched the
description given by the victim immediately after
the robbery, id., at 52, 59; the victim failed to
identify anyone other than respondent, id., at 8,
but twice selected respondent without hesitation
in nonsuggestive pretrial identification
procedures, id., at 9-11; and only a week had
passed between the victim's initial observation
of respondent and her first identification of
him, id., at 8-9.
445 U.S. at 473 n.18.
In analyzing this second element, the court cautioned that
a fourth amendment violation could, in some circumstances, "affect
the reliability of the in-court identification and render it
inadmissible."

Id. at 546.

Application of this second element in Crews requires
suppression of the pre-seizure identifications in the present case.
The most compelling circumstance requiring suppression is the fact
that there is apparently no record of the descriptions given by
witnesses prior to the illegal seizure.

R. 34.

Officers testified

that they made no attempt to get descriptions of the perpetrator
prior to entering the Gurule home.
26.

R. 280; see discussion supra at

In the absence of such descriptions, it is impossible to

ascertain whether pre-seizure identification testimony is based on
untainted independent recollections, or merely the product of
viewing Mr. Gurule during the illegal showup.

This contrasts

markedly with Crews where the victim gave a detailed description of
her assailant before viewing him in the photo array and lineup.
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The conditions for viewing the perpetrator were also
markedly different than those in Crews.

In addition, the showup

procedure itself was suggestive and tainted by input from other
onlookers.

In Crews. the procedures utilized were not themselves

suggestive but merely the fruit of an illegal arrest.

Repeated

viewing of an individual often results in increased certainty that
that person is the perpetrator, regardless of whether the individual
was initially viewed at the scene of the crime.

In this case, the

witnesses saw Mr. Gurule at the suggestive showup, the preliminary
hearing, the motion hearing, and in the neighborhood.
realize that Mr. Gurule is their neighbor.

They all now

Under such

circumstances, their memories are tainted by subsequent events, and
it is impossible for them to make an independent description.
The third Crews element focuses on whether the defendant's
presence at trial is the fruit of the fourth amendment violation.
In this case, there was no basis for linking Mr. Gurule to the
assault on Mr. Haddenham prior to the fourth amendment violation.
None of the witnesses told the officers that the person who
assaulted Dale Haddenham was the neighbor.

It was only after seeing

Mr. Gurule in the showup that the witnesses became convinced that he
was the perpetrator.

Absent the fourth amendment violation, there

was no basis for linking Mr. Gurule to this crime.

The State has

not established that absent the fourth amendment violation, it would
have charged Mr. Gurule in this case.
In State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, the defendant raised a
fourth amendment issue as well as a due process eyewitness
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identification issue.

The Utah Supreme Court held that the

defendant was seized in violation of the fourth amendment and that
the eyewitness identification was improperly admitted.
The exclusionary rule applies not only to
evidence obtained directly as a result of the
illegal seizure, but also to evidence obtained by
exploitation of the illegality, unless the
evidence was obtained by means "'sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint.'" [citations omitted]. Because Wilson's
identification of Ramirez was a direct result of
the seizure of Ramirez, it and other evidence
obtained through exploitation of the seizure must
be suppressed if the seizure was illegal.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 786.
In the present case, the State failed to establish that the
witnesses had independent, specific recollections of the appearance
of Mr. Haddenham's assailant.

The witnesses were present when other

witnesses were pointing to and selecting Mr. Gurule.
him as part of a suggestive identification procedure.
record of their initial, untainted descriptions.

They viewed
There is no

Any description

the witnesses would now give would be irrevocably tainted by their
having viewed Mr. Gurule.
While the witnesses viewed the perpetrator before the
illegal seizure occurred, their memory of what they saw has now been
influenced by the subsequent procedures.

In the absence of a clear

record as to what was witnessed prior to the seizure, the State
cannot meet its burden of establishing that any description is not
tainted by the subsequent events.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
trial court order allowing evidence of "pre-seizure" identification
testimony, and remand the case for trial.
SUBMITTED this \IAL

day of December, 1992.

J6XN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

PATRICK L. ANDERSON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

By

U K J J I L K Deputy CierK

Case No. 920099-CA

v.
Richard M. Gurule,
Defendant and Petitioner.

This matter is before the court on a petition for permission
to appeal from an interlocutory order.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is granted.

All

proceedings subsequent shall be as, and within the time required,
for appeals from final judgments.

Utah R. App. P. 5(e).

DATED this^/*7<* day of March, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

^

^

^

^

^

^

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

I tte urcters'gned, Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals,
do hereby certify {hat the forego:rg is a full, true and
correct ccny cJ an original document on file in the Utah
• Court of Appeals In 'estimony whereof, I have set my
hand and affixed the seal of the Couc
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ADDENDUM B

TEXT OP CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States provides:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law.
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JAMES C. BRADSHAW, #3768
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Dtah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

.-ir.T^ICXr

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:
:

MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION

Plaintiff
v.

:

RICHARD M. GURULE,

:
:

Case No. 901901297
JUDGE JAMES S. SAWAYA

Defendant
The defendant, RICHARD M. GURULE, through counsel, JAMES C.
BRADSHAW, moves the court to suppress statements of witnesses
relating to their identification of RICHARD M. GURULE at the trial
on November 8, 1990 and to suppress their in court identification of
him.

This motion is based on the grounds that the identification

procedure employed by the police officer violated the defendant's
rights under the Due Process clauses of the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution.
DATED this

(^J day of September.
Respectfully Submitted,

C. BRADSHAW
rney for Defendant

00020

NOTICE OF HEARING
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COUNTY COURT:
You and each of you please take notice that defendant's
Motion to Suppress Eyewitness Identification will come on regularly
for a hearing on the 10th day of October, 1990, at the hour of 10:00
a.m. before the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Third District Court
Judge.

Please govern yourself accordingly.
DATED this

c&

day of September, 1990.
Respectfully Submitted,

S C. BRADSHAW
rney for Defendant
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of the Salt
Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
this

day of September, 1990.
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JAMES C. BRADSHAW, #3768
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

MOTION TO SUPPRESS
AND NOTICE OF HEARING

Plaintiff,
V.

Case No. 901901297
JUDGE JAMES S. SAWAYA

RICHARD M. GURULE,
Defendant.

The defendant, RICHARD GURULE, through his attorney of
record, JAMES C. BRADSHAW, hereby moves this Court to suppress all
evidence acquired subsequent to, and as a result of the illegal
entry into defendant's home in violation of the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article I Section 14 of the Utah
State Constitution.
DATED this

J.
V_ day of March, 1991.
Respectfully Submitted,

JAMES C. BRADSHAW
A X t o r n e Y for Defendant
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NOTICE OF HEARING
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT:
You and each of you please take notice that the aboveentitled matter will come on regularly for hearing on Thursday, the
11th day of April, 1991, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. before the
Honorable James S. Sawaya, Third District Court Judge.

Please

govern yourselves accordingly.
DATED this

fr

day of March, 1991.

JAMES JC. BRADSHAW
llttor/ftey for Defendant

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the Sal^
Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, UT
this

84111

day of March, 1991.
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ADDENDUM D

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
STATE OF UTAH
PLAINTIFF

vs
GURULE, RICHARD M

CASE NUMBER 901901297 FS
DATE 04/17/91
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK STG

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS HAVING BEEN HEARD BY THIS
COURT AND THE MATTER OF THE COURT'S DECISION HAVING BEEN TAKEN
UNDER ADVISEMENT. THE COURT HAVING CONSIDERED AND NOW BEING
FULLY ADVISED IN THE PREMISES ORDERS SAID MOTIONS BE AND THE
SAME ARE HEREBY GRANTED.
CC: JAMES BfcADSHAW
KEN UPDEGROVE
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ADDENDUM E

MAY

JAMES C. BRADSHAW (3768)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444

8 1991
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
V.

RICHARD M. GURULE,

Case No. 901901297FS
JUDGE JAMES S. SAWAYA

Defendant,
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing pursuant to
defendant's Motion to Suppress Eyewitness Identification, and
defendant's Motion to Suppress based upon violation of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Arte I, §14 of the
Utah State Constitution on the 11th day of April, 1991. The
defendant was present with his attorney, James C. Bradshaw, the
State was represented by Kenneth Updegrove.

The Court heard the

testimony of Dorothy Knowlden, Eddie Knowlden, Rodney Knowlden, Dan
Dimmick, Fred Mattfeld, Coy Accock, Kathy Bradley, Lynette Gurule,
and Daniele Gurule.

The Court then having heard the arguments of

counsel and being provided a copy of State v. Ramirez, #880425 filed
March 21, 1991, and the Court having previously taken this matter
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under advisement the Court enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On May 1, 1990 officers from the West Valley Police

Department responded to an alleged aggravated assault situation at
3215 South Oriole Way.
2.

That upon arriving the officers heard witnesses

proclaim that someone that might be responsible for the aggravated
assault had run into the residence at 2561 Starling Avenue.
3.

That 2561 Starling Avenue is the defendant's home.

4.

That although the officers believed that witnesses had

stated that the perpetrators had entered the residence on Starling
Avenue, no witnesses had observed the petpetrator enter that
residence.
5.

That there was no further investigation by the West

Valley Police Officers prior to their entering the defendant's home
and had there been further investigation it would have revealed that
there was, in fact, no basis to believe that the perpetrator of the
aggravated assault had entered that home.
6.

That the officers pounded on the doors of the Gurule

home on Starling Avenue until such time as Lynette Gurule came to
the back door.
7.

That Ms. Gurule refused entry to the home indicating to

the officers that a search warrant was required prior to entry.
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8.

That the officers entered the Gurule home in the face

of the refusal by Lynette Gurule and in the absence of any consent
by her.
9.

That upon entering the home defendant, Richard M.

Gurule, was seized and he was subsequently forced to appear in a
"show-up" procedure at which time witnesses to the alleged
aggravated assault viewed his person.
10.

That the defendant was the only person in the

"show-up" which matched the physical description of the aggravated
assault perpetrator.
11.

That there was conflicting testimony in regards as to

whether the eyewitnesses viewed the participants in the "show-up"
individually or collectively; that is, while discussing the matter
with each other.

But that in any event at least some of the persons

claiming to have made an eyewitness identification of the defendant
had the opportunity to observe other eyewitnesses choose the
defendant as the perpetrator of the offense prior to making their
own determination.
12.

That the eyewitnesses had been drinking prior to

making identification and in at least one instance were drinking
beer at the time the identification was made.
13.

That the police failed to obtain or maintain any

permanent record regarding descriptions of the assailant given by
the eyewitnesses prior to the time the "show-up" occurred.
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14.

That the police failed to record which of the

eyewitnesses identified the defendant as the perpetrator of the
assault.
15.

That the police failed to record which of the

eyewitnesses identified the Richard Gurule as the person who while
in the house prior to the assault on Mr. Hadenham assaulted Dorothy
Knowlden and therefore could not have been the assailant of the
victim, Mr. Hadenham.
16.

That the two eyewitnesses that testified in regards to

their opportunity to observe the actual assault, testified one had
five seconds and the other observed the assailant for two seconds.
Both witnesses acknowledged that it was a stressful situation and
their attention was diverted by factors such as, other persons
coming at them.
WHEREFORE the Court issues the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That entry into the Gurule home on May 5, 1990 was in

violation of the defendant's right under the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Art. I, §14 of the Utah State
Constitution in that the entry to the house was made in the absence
of exigent circumstances and without a warrant, which easily could
have been obtained by telephone or other means.
2.

That the illegal entry and subsequent seizure of the

defendant requires that all evidence acquired as a result of that
illegal entry and seizure must be ordered suppressed.
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3.

That the failure of the West Valley Police Department

to accurately record the initial descriptions given by the
eyewitnesses, and the results of the "show-up" conducted in this
case along with the suggestive circumstances of the "show-up" itself
requires suppression under the guidelines articulated in State v.
Ramirez, supra, Art I, §7, Utah State Constitution.
DATED this

day of May, 1991.
BY THE

HONORABLE JAMES Sf SAWAYA
Third District Court

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of the Salt
Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
this

day of May, 1991.
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ADDENDUM F
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ADDENDUM G

PATRICK L. ANDERSON (4787)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444

JAN 2 3 1S92
SALT '.AKi '„, ,oiv. V
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

:

SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

-v-

:

RICHARD M. GURULE,

:

Case No. 901901297
JUDGE JAMES S. SAWAYA

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 18th
day of October, 1991, pursuant to the Court's clarification of a
portion of its prior order suppressing certain evidence and pursuant
to defendant's motion to vacate the Court's clarification based on
lack of jurisdiction.

Defendant was present with his attorney,

Patrick L. Anderson, the State was represented by Kenneth
Updegrove.

The Court having heard the arguments of counsel and

having previously considered the clarification of a portion of its
prior order suppressing certain evidence, the court enters the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On September 25, 1990, defendant filed a motion to

suppress the eyewitness identification.
2.

On March 19, 1991, defendant filed a motion to suppress

and notice of hearing requesting the court to suppress all evidence
acquired subsequent to, and as a result of, the illegal entry of

nni98

defendant's home in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article I Section 14 of the Utah State
Constitution.
3.

Both of defendant's motions to suppress came on for

hearing on the 11th day of April, 1991.
4.

After hearing the testimony of witnesses and brief

arguments of counsel and having been provided a copy of State v.
Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (1991) the Court took the matter under
advisement.
5.

On April 17, 1991, counsel for the defendant received a

minute entry, attached hereto is exhibit "A", which stated that,
"defendant's motions to suppress having been heard by this court and
the matter of the court's decision having been taken under
advisement.

The court having considered and now being fully advised

in the premises orders said motions be and the same are hereby
granted."
6.

That pursuant to the Court's request, counsel for the

defendant prepared findings of fact and conclusions of law
consistent with the court's ruling, which was submitted to counsel
for the state.
7.

That the court signed the findings of fact and

conclusions of law submitted by the defendant on May 8, 1991. A
copy of defendant's findings of fact and conclusions of law is
attached hereto as exhibit "B".
8.

On May 14, 1991, counsel for the State submitted

plaintiff's objections to defendant's findings of fact and
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conclusions of law,

A copy of plaintiff's objections is attached

hereto as exhibit "C"•
9.

On July 23, 1991, counsel for the defendant submitted a

memorandum in support of defendant's motion for suppression.
10.

On June 26, 1991, counsel for the state submitted a

memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to defendant's
position concerning suppression of pre-seizure eyewitness
identification.
11.

That counsel for the defendant received a minute entry

dated August 19f 1991 which purported to clarify a portion of the
court's prior findings of fact and conclusions of law entered on May
8, 1991. A copy of the minute entry is attached hereto as exhibit
"D".
12.

That prior to the hearing held on October 18, 1991,

counsel for the State had not yet received a copy of the minute
entry attached hereto as exhibit "D".
13.

That defendant is not incarcerated and any further

delay in this case pending a possible appeal, would not prejudice
the defendant.
WHEREFORE the court issues the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the eyewitness identification evidence obtained

prior to the illegal search and seizure may properly be offered and
admitted if otherwise competent, and is not to be suppressed as part
of the Court's prior order dated May 8, 1991.
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2.

That the Court had jurisdiction to clarify its prior

findings of fact and conclusions of law, dated May 8, 1991.
3.

That any further proceedings in this action are stayed

against the defendant pending the outcome of plaintiff's petition
for interlocutory appeal which may be filed subsequent to the entry
of these findings of fact and conclusions of law.
DATED this

day of January, 1992.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

KENNETH UPDEGROV!
Deputy County Attorne

HONORABLE JAMES S. S^fAYA
Third District Court

Reze-)\J£D

ait

MAILED/DELIVERED 'a copy of the foregoing -fee- the South
Valley County Attorney, 2001 South State Street, #S3700, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84190-1200 this ^ZX^^L^ day of January, 1992.

/^~-*U^££=&>

/^fe^2y^&U2^
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FILED
DISTRICTCOURT

DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney
KENNETH R. UPDEGROVE, Bar No. 4931
Deputy County Attorney
2001 South State Street, #S3700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
Telephone: (801) 468-3422
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS
TO DEFENDANT'S FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RICHARD M. GURULE,

Case No. 901901297FS

Defendant.
Having

personally

Honorable James S. Sawaya
received

a copy of the

above-captioned

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law from counsel for defendant,
plaintiff hereby objects as follows:

EINDINSS OF FACT
1.

Finding No. 1 incorrectly states the date as May 1,

1990, when the events occurred during the late evening of May 4 and
early morning of May 5, 1990.

When the police arrived on the scene,

they were initially unsure what had happened.

After speaking with

medical personnel already present, the police were concerned that
the victim might die.
2.

Finding No. 3 does not state the police were unaware

that the Starling Avenue address was defendant's home.
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3.

Defendant's Findings do not indicate the police concerns

for the safety of any individuals who might be within the Starling
Avenue

address particularly when

there was no

response

to their

several minutes of knocking, the young woman who finally came to the
door claimed there were no other individuals present and the police
heard movement and later saw other individuals within the home, and
the young woman's extreme nervousness.
4.

There was conflicting testimony whether or not Lynette

Gurule asked the police for a search warrant as stated in Finding
No. 7.
5.

Finding No. 8 does not reflect that there was testimony

indicating Lynette Gurule eventually gave some form of consent for
the police to enter the Starling Avenue home.
6.
agreement

Finding

No. 9 does

not

reflect

defendant's

eventual

to appear in the "show up- along with the other young

males discovered

in the Starling Avenue home.

Defendant was not

dragged from the home.
7.

Finding No. 12 does not reflect testimony that none of

the witnesses were drunk at the time they made their identifications.
The Knowlden family party had begun less than an hour prior to the
uninvited individuals entering their home.
8.

Finding No. 15 does not reflect that plaintiff has not

nor does it intend to charge defendant with an assault on Dorothy
Knowlden.

Testimony was received that defendant might have been at

the bottom of the stairs close to the front door which would have
allowed him to quickly get into a position for an assault on Mr.
Haddenham.
-2-
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9.

Finding No. 16 does not correctly state the range of

time during which the witnesses were only a matter of feet from the
assailant nor does it indicate the excellent quality of the lighting
at the time of the assault.
10.

Additionally,

because

the

results

of

the

-show up-

flowing from the illegal entry are being suppressed. Finding Nos. 10
through 15 are not needed and tend to add elements unnecessary to
the disposition of defendant's Motion to Suppress.

The same can be

said of Finding No. 16 which deals with eyewitness testimony during
the assault and prior to the police entering defendant's home.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Conclusion

No.

3

is

confusing

and

superfluous.

Conclusion No. 2 clearly states all evidence acquired as a result of
the illegal entry and seizure is to be suppressed.

This includes

the "show up" and the results obtained.
DATED this

day of May, 1991.

KENNETH R. UPDEGROV^
77
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I

hereby

certify

that

a

true

and

correct

copy

of

the

foregoing Plaintiff's Objections to Defendant's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law was delivered to James C. Bradshaw, counsel for
defendant, by placement in the Legal Defender Association box in the
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office on this

day of May, 1991.
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